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Abstract
Recent years witness a growing interest in nonstandard epistemic logics of “knowing
whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how”, and so on. These logics are usually not normal,
i.e., the standard axioms and reasoning rules for modal logic may be invalid. In this paper,
we show that the conditional “knowing value” logic proposed by Wang and Fan [12] can
be viewed as a disguised normal modal logic by treating the negation of the Kv operator as
a special diamond. Under this perspective, it turns out that the original first-order Kripke
semantics can be greatly simplified by introducing a ternary relation Rc
i
in standard Kripke
models, which associates one world with two i-accessible worlds that do not agree on the
value of constant c. Under intuitive constraints, the modal logic based on such Kripke mod-
els is exactly the one studied by Wang and Fan [12,13]. Moreover, there is a very natural
binary generalization of the “knowing value” diamond, which, surprisingly, does not in-
crease the expressive power of the logic. The resulting logic with the binary diamond has
a transparent normal modal system, which sharpens our understanding of the “knowing
value” logic and simplifies some previously hard problems.
Keywords: knowing value, normal modal logic, ternary relation, binary modality,
first-order modal logic
1 Introduction
Classic epistemic logic à la von Wright and Hintikka mainly studies the inference
patterns about propositional knowledge by using a modal operator Ki to express
that agent i knows that a proposition is true. Epistemic logic has been success-
fully applied to various fields to capture knowledge and its change in multi-agent
settings, such as distributed systems and imperfect information games (cf. e.g.
[3,9]). However, in everyday life, knowledge is often expressed in terms of know-
ing the answer to an embedding question, such as “I know whether the claim is
true”, “I know what your password is”, “I know how to prove the theorem” and
so on. Recent years witness a growing interest in the logics of such knowledge
⋆ Published in the proceedings of AiML 2016 pp. 362-381 by College Publications. This is a draft with
a more detailed proof of Proposition 3.5.
⋆⋆Yanjing Wang acknowledges the support from the National Program for Special Support of Eminent
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2 “Knowing value” logic as a normal modal logic
expressions [7,8,12,13,4,5,10]. The fundamental idea is to simply treat “knowing
whether”, “knowing what”, “knowing how” as new modalities, just as “knowing
that” in standard epistemic logic (cf. the survey [11]).
The resulting logics are usually not normal in the technical sense that usual
modal axioms and rules may be invalid. For example, the K axiom for normal
modal logic is not valid for the knowing whether operator, i.e., Kw(p → q) ∧
Kwp→ Kwq does not hold, e.g., knowing that p is false makes sure that you know
whether p and also whether p → q, but it does not tell you anything about the
truth value of q. Similarly, knowing how to swim and knowing how to cook does
not mean knowing how to swim and cook at the same time, thus invalidating
Khp∧Khq→ Kh(p∧q), a theorem in normal modal logic when taking Kh as a box
modality.
On the other hand, the non-normality does not necessarily mean that we have
to abandon Kripke models for more general models. As demonstrated in [5], we
can still use Kripke models to accommodate those non-normal modal logics by
using nonstandard yet intuitive truth conditions for the new modalities. However,
there is usually a clear asymmetry between the relatively simple modal language
and the “rich” model which may cause troubles in axiomatizing the logic. For
example, the conditional knowing value logic proposed in [12] has the following
language ELKvr(where i ∈ I, p ∈ P, c ∈ C and I,P,C are countably infinite):
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | Kiφ | Kvi(φ, c)
where Kvi(φ, c) says that i knows [what] the value of c [is], given φ, e.g., I know
the password of this website given it is 4-digit, since I may have only one 4-digit
password ever, although I am not sure which password I used for this website
without the information on the digits. The language is interpreted on first-order
Kripke modelsM = 〈S,D, {→i : i ∈ I},V,VC〉 where 〈S, {→i : i ∈ I},V 〉 is a standard
Kripke model, and D is a constant domain, and VC assigns to each (non-rigid)
c ∈ C an element in D on each s ∈ S. The semantics for the new Kvi operator is as
follows:
M , s  Kvi(φ, c) ⇐⇒ for any t1, t2 : if s→i t1, s→i t2,M , t1  φ andM , t2  φ,
then VC(c, t1) = VC(c, t2).
According to this semantics, the formula Kvi(φ, c) can also be understood as a first-
order modal formula: ∃xKi(φ→ c = x).
1 Thus ELKvr can be viewed as a (small)
fragment of first-order modal logic where a quantifier is packed with a modality.
It is shown in [12] that ELKvr is equally expressive as public announcement logic
extended with unconditional Kvi operators proposed in [7] (i.e., only Kvi(⊤, c)
are allowed). Satisfiability of ELKvr over arbitrary models is PSPACE-complete,
as proved in [2]. Note that although values are assigned to the constants in the
model, we cannot talk about them explicitly in the language. In fact, we only care
about whether on some worlds a given constant has exactly the same value. The
1 Note that there is a constant domain D and each c has a unique value on each state.
3contrast between the rich model and the simple language made the completeness
proof of the following axiomatization SELKVrS5 quite involved over multi-agent
S5 models (cf. [13]). 2
System SELKVrS5
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK Ki(p→ q)→ (Kip→ Kiq)
T Kip→ p
4 Kip→ KiKip
5 ¬Kip→ Ki¬Kip
DISTKv
r Ki(p→ q)→ (Kvi(q, c)→ Kvi(p, c))
Kv
r4 Kvi(p, c)→ KiKvi(p, c)
Kv
r⊥ Kvi(⊥, c)
Kv
r∨ Kˆi(p ∧ q)∧Kvi(p, c)∧Kvi(q, c)→ Kvi(p∨ q, c)
Rules
MP
p, p→ q
q
NECK
φ
Kiφ
SUB
φ
φ[p/ψ]
RE
ψ↔ χ
φ↔ φ[ψ/χ]
Since the Kvi operator is not a modality taking only propositions as arguments, it
is hard to say whether the above logic is normal or not. DISTKvr looks a little
bit like the K axiom but it is in fact about the interaction between Ki and Kvi .
Kv
r4 is a variation of the positive introspection axiom, and the corresponding
negative introspection is derivable. Kvr⊥ says that the Kvi operator is essentially
a conditional. Axiom Kvr∨ handles the composition of the conditions, where Kˆi is
the dual of Ki .
In this paper, we look at ELKvr from a new yet “normal modal logic” perspect-
ive in order to answer the following questions:
(i) Since we do not talk about values in the language, is there a simpler value-
free Kripke-model based semantics for ELKvr that can keep the logic (valid
formulas) the same? If so, we can restore the symmetry between the lan-
guage and the model and understand the essence of our logic.
(ii) Can ELKvr be linked to a normal modal logic (modulo some syntactic trans-
formation)? If so, we can apply many standard modal logic techniques to
simplify previously complicated discussions.
We give positive answers to both questions, inspired by a crucial observation:
Observation ¬Kvi(φ, c) can be viewed as a diamond operator ◊
c
i
φ which says that
there are two i-accessible φ-worlds, which do not agree on the value of c.
Note that to simplify the technical discussion in order to reveal the crucial
points, in this paper we focus on the logic over arbitrary models. Our techniques
can be applied to the S5 setting.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as below:
• We give a simple alternative Kripke semantics to ELKvr without value assign-
2 φ[ψ/χ] in the rule RE (replacement of equivalents) denotes any formula obtained by replacing
some occurrences of ψ by χ.
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ments, which does not change the set of valid formulas. The completeness
proof is much simpler compared to the one in [13].
• We generalize ◊c
i
φ in a natural way to a binary diamond operator ◊c
i
(φ,ψ). It
turns out the generalization does not increase the expressive power of the logic
but it can give us a transparent normal modal logic proof system.
• The normal modal logic perspective helps us to discover a bisimulation notion
for ELKvr and obtain a proof system for a weaker language proposed by [7].
Our findings show that ELKvr is essentially a “disguised” normal logic, and this
may help us to understand such nonstandard epistemic operators better.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first introduce in Section 2 the
language with the unary diamond ◊c
i
and a semantics based on Kripke model with
both binary and ternary relations under three intuitive constraints. We show that
this semantics is equivalent to the original FO Kripke semantics of ELKvr modulo
validity (under a straightforward syntactic translation). In Section 3 we prove the
completeness of the translated SELKVr system w.r.t. the new semantics directly.
This demonstrates the advantages of using this simplified semantics. In Section 4
we generalize the ◊c
i
naturally to a binary one and show that the extended lan-
guage is in fact equally expressive as ELKvr . On the other hand, the extended
language facilitates a transparent normal logic proof system. It then helps us in
Section 5 to come up with a notion of bisimulation for ELKvr and obtain a proof
system for a weaker language proposed earlier. We conclude in the end with future
directions.
2 Negation of Kvi as a diamond
As we mentioned in the introduction, ¬Kvi(φ, c) can be viewed as a diamond
formula ◊c
i
φ: there are two i-accessible φ-worlds which do not agree on the value
of c. Then c
i
φ := ¬◊c
i
¬φ means that all the i-accessible ¬φ-worlds agree on the
value of c (and it is Kvi(¬φ, c) essentially.). For uniformity of the language, we
take c
i
as the primitive symbol and introduce the following language (MLKvr):
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) |iφ |
c
i
φ
where p ∈ P, c ∈ C, i ∈ I. We can, without difficulty, inductively define a translation
function T from the original ELKvr to this modal language (the other way is also
straightforward):
Definition 2.1 A translation function T from ELKvr to MLKvr formulas is defined
as follows:
T (p) = p
T (¬φ) = ¬T (φ)
T (φ ∧ψ) = T (φ)∧ T (ψ)
T (Kiφ) = iT (φ)
T (Kvi(φ, c)) = 
c
i
¬T (φ)
5Now we have the following translated axioms (the names are kept):
T (DISTKvr) = i(p→ q)→ (
c
i
¬q→ c
i
¬p)
T (Kvr∨) = ◊i(p ∧ q)∧
c
i
¬p ∧c
i
¬q→c
i
¬(p∨ q)
T (Kvr⊥) = c
i
(¬⊥)
We can massage the axioms, 3 and obtain the following equivalent system (mod-
ulo translation T) from SELKVr (i.e., SELKVr -S5 without the S5 related axioms
T,4,5,Kvr4):
System SMLKVr
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK i(p→ q)→ (ip→iq)
DISTKv
r i(p→ q)→ (
c
i
p→c
i
q)
Kv
r∨ ◊i(p ∧ q)∧◊
c
i
(p∨ q)→ (◊c
i
p ∨◊c
i
q)
Rules
MP
φ,φ→ψ
ψ
NECK
φ
iφ
NECKv
r
φ
c
i
φ
SUB
φ
φ[p/ψ]
RE
ψ↔ χ
φ↔ φ[ψ/χ]
Note that instead of Kvr⊥, we have a more classic-looking rule NECKvr . In
fact, it is equivalent to have either Kvr⊥ or NECKvr in the system: from NECKvr ,
it is trivial to derive Kvr⊥, and from Kvr⊥, DISTKvr and NECK it is also straight-
forward to derive each instance of NECKvr by taking p in DISTKvr as ⊤.
To a modal logician, SMLKVr may look much more friendly compared to
SELKVr . In particular, Kvr∨ is simply a conditional distribution axiom for ◊c
i
over
disjunction. Note that ◊i(p∨q)→ (◊ip∨◊iq) is valid but ◊
c
i
(p∨q)→ (◊c
i
p∨◊c
i
q) is
not, e.g., all the p worlds agree on the value of c and all the q worlds agree on the
value of c but they just cannot agree with each other. This demonstrates that ◊c
i
is apparently not a normal modality. However, as we will discover later that this
apparent non-normality is a bit misleading and we will restore the normality in
the next section by considering a natural binary generalization of the ◊c
i
operator.
Now we are going to give a simplified but equivalent semantics toMLKvr such
that the system SMLKVr is sound and complete. The idea is to abandon the
first-order Kripke model and use a rather standard Kripke model for propositional
modal logics since much of the information in the FO Kripke model is not relevant
for the language MLKvr .
Definition 2.2 A model for MLKvr is a tuple 〈S, {→i : i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},V 〉,
where
• 〈S, {→i: i ∈ I},V 〉 is a standard Kripke model with binary relations.
• For each c ∈ C, Rc
i
is a triple relation over S satisfying for any s, t,u, v ∈ S:
3 For example, T(DISTKvr) is equivalent to i(¬q → ¬p) → (
c
i
¬q → c
i
¬p) under RE, which is
equivalent to i(p→ q)→ (i p→ iq) under SUB.
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(i) SYM: sRc
i
tu ⇐⇒ sRc
i
ut
(ii) INCL: sRc
i
tu only if s→i t and s→i u
(iii) ATEUC: sRc
i
tu and s→i v imply that at least one of sR
c
i
t v and sRc
i
uv holds
Intuitively, sRc
i
tu roughly means that s can see two i-accessible worlds t,u
which do not agree on the value of c, although we do not have value assignments
for c in the model. Further conditions are imposed to let the ternary relation really
capture what we want. (i) is a symmetry condition on the later two arguments
of Rc
i
. Condition (ii) establishes the connection between the ternary and binary
relations. The most crucial condition is (iii), an anti-euclidean property 4 that
says if two i-accessible worlds do not agree on the value of c then for any third
i-accessible world it must disagree with one of the two worlds on c. 5
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The new semantics is defined as follows which reflects the intuition behind Rc
i
:
M , s ⊤ always
M , s  p ⇔ s ∈ V (p)
M , s  ¬φ ⇔ M , s 6 φ
M , s  φ ∧ψ ⇔ M , s  φ andM , s ψ
M , s  ◊iφ ⇔ there exists t such that s→i t andM , t  φ
M , s  ◊c
i
φ ⇔ there exist u, v such that sRc
i
uv,M ,u  φ andM , v  φ
In the rest of this section, we show that the above semantics of MLKvr is
equivalent to the semantics for ELKvr modulo the syntactic translation T . To
show this, the difficult part is to saturate an MLKvr model with value assignments
while keeping the truth values of formulas modulo translation T . Note that this
is not straightforward, as it is possible in an MLKvr model that sRc
i
t t and there is
no way to assign to c two different values on the same world t. Moreover, it can
happen that sRc
i
uv, s→ j u and s→ j v while it is not the case that sR
c
j
uv. However,
we can avoid such problem by preprocessing the MLKvr model before assigning
valuations.
Lemma 2.3 For any set of ELKvr formula Σ∪ {φ}, Σ  φ iff T (Σ)  T (φ).
Proof It suffices to prove that for any set of ELKvr formula Σ, Σ is -satisfiable iff
T (Σ) is -satisfiable. We say that an ELKvr modelM , s is equivalent to an MLKvr
4 Euclidean property says that ∀x , y, z : xRy ∧ xRz → yRz. Taking R′ = R¯ we have ∀x , y, z : ¬xR′ y ∧
¬xR′z→¬yR′z, i.e., ∀x , y, z : yR′z→ xR′ y ∨ xR′z. Our condition is inspired by this observation.
5 Careful readers may wonder about whether we can break the the ternary relation into two: the
i-relation and an anti-equivalence relation. We will come back to this point at the end of the paper.
7modelN , t if for all φ ∈ ELKvr : M , s  φ ⇐⇒ N , t  T (φ). In the following we
show that for any pointed FO Kripke modelM , s for ELKvr , there is an equivalent
MLKvr model N , t, and vice versa.
⇒: For any pointed FO Kripke modelM , s, we can naturally define the ternary
relation Rc
i
as follows: sRc
i
tu iff s→i t, s→i u and VC (c, t) 6= VC (c,u). It’s straight-
forward to check that the resulting model N is an MLKvr model (satisfying the
three conditions) and N , s is equivalent toM , s.
⇐: Recall that what we need to show is the following: given an MLKvr model
N = 〈S, {→i: i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},V 〉 and t ∈ S, find an ELKvr model M , s
such that M , s  φ ⇐⇒ N , t  T (φ). As mentioned, we need to preprocess N
before assigning values.
The preprocessing consists of two steps: splitting and unraveling. We first split
the states in N into two copies in order to handle the uRc
i
vv problem mentioned
before. Let N ′ be 〈S ×{0,1}, {→′
i
: i ∈ I}, {P c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},V ′〉, where:
• (u, x)→′
i
(v, y) ⇐⇒ u→i v
• (u, x)P c
i
(v, y)(w, z) ⇐⇒ uRc
i
vw and (v, y) 6= (w, z)
• V ′((u, x)) = V (u)
It can be verified that N ′ has the three properties of MLKvr models, 6 and
there is no state v such that uP c
i
vv for any u, v. We can prove the following claim
by a simple induction on the structure of MLKvr formulas:
N ,u ≡MLKvr N
′, (u, x) where x ∈ {0,1}
The only non-trivial case is when φ = ◊c
i
ψ. Suppose N ,u  ◊c
i
ψ, then
there exist v, v′ ∈ S (v and v′ are not necessarily different) such that uRc
i
vv′,
N , v  ψ and N , v′  ψ. By the definition of P c
i
and the induction hypothesis,
(u, x)P c
i
(v, 0)(v′, 1), N ′, (v, 0) ψ and N ′, (v′, 1) ψ, so N ′, (u, x)  ◊c
i
ψ. Sup-
pose N ′, (u, x)  ◊c
i
ψ, then there exist (v, y)(v′, z) such that (u, x)P c
i
(v, y)(v′, z),
N , (v, y)  ψ and N , (v′, z)  ψ. According to the definition of P c
i
, this en-
tails (v, y) 6= (v′, z) and uRc
i
vv′. By induction hypothesis, N , (v, y)  ψ and
N , (v′, z) ψ, so N ,u  ◊c
i
ψ. As a simple consequence,
N , s ≡MLKvr N
′, (s, 0) (1)
To simplify notation, we shall write (s, 0) as s′ in the rest of this proof.
Now we unravel N ′ at s′ intoM ′ = 〈W, {,→i: i ∈ I}, {Q
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},U ′〉:
• W = {〈s′, i1, v1, . . . , ik, vk〉 : there is a path s
′
i1
→ v1 . . .
ik
→ vk in N
′}. Note that the
trivial path 〈s′〉 ∈W ,
• 〈s′, i1, . . . , vk〉 ,→i 〈s
′, j1, . . . ,um〉 iff m= k+1, 〈s
′, i1, . . . , vk〉 = 〈s
′, j1, . . . ,uk〉, jm =
i and vk →
′
i
um in N
′,
6 Take the anti-euclidean property as an example. Suppose (u, x)P c
i
(v, y)(v′ , y′) and (u, x)→′
i
(w, z).
If (w, z) is one of (v, y) and (v′, y′), done. If not, then (u, x)P c
i
(v, y)(v′ , y′) implies uRc
i
vw, and
(u, x) →′
i
(w, z) implies u →i w. By the anti-euclidean property of the original model N , we have
either uRc
i
vw or uRc
i
v′w. So either (u, x)Rc
i
(v, y)(w, z) or (u, x)Rc
i
(v′, y′)(w, z).
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• 〈s′, i1, . . . , vk〉Q
c
i
〈s′, j1, . . . ,um〉〈s
′, l1, . . . , ln〉 iff vkP
c
i
umln, 〈s
′, i1, . . . , vk〉 ,→i
〈s′, j1, . . . ,um〉 and 〈s
′, i1, . . . , vk〉 ,→i 〈s
′, l1, . . . , ln〉,
• U ′(〈s′, i1, . . . ,u〉) = V
′(u).
Intuitively, the new modelM ′ starts from 〈s′〉, and each state corresponds to a
path which is accessible from s′ in N ′. It is not hard to verify the three properties
of MLKvr models. 7 By definition, the ,→ skeleton of M ′ is a tree-like structure:
acyclic, every state except the root 〈s′〉 can be reached eventually by 〈s′〉 and has
one and only one predecessor. It follows that for any u, v inM ′, it is not the case
that u ,→i v and u ,→ j v for any i 6= j.
Now we can prove the following by induction on the structure of φ ∈MLKvr :
M ′, 〈s′, i1, v1, . . . , ik, vk〉 ≡MLKvr N
′, vk In particular,
N ′, s′ ≡MLKvr M
′, 〈s′〉 (2)
Now the only thing left is to transform theMLKvr modelM ′ into an equivalent
ELKvr model M . Basically, we just need to give values to c ∈ C on each state
according to the ternary relations Qc
j
. LetM = 〈W,D, {,→i: i ∈ I},U ,VC〉 where:
• W and {,→i: i ∈ I} are exactly the same as inM
′;
• U = U ′;
• VC(c,w) = |(c,w)|∼. That is, VC(c,w) is the equivalence class under the equival-
ence relation ∼ over C×W defined as:
∼ = {〈(c,u), (e, v)〉 : c = e,∃s∃ j : s ,→ j u, s ,→ j v,∀w ∈ W : ¬wQ
c
j
uv} ∪
{〈(c,u), (c,u)〉 | (c,u) ∈ C×W}
• D = {|(c,w)|∼ | (c,w) ∈ C×W};
To make sure M is well-defined, we need to show that ∼ is an equivalence
relation. Reflexivity and symmetry are obvious, and for transitivity: If (c,w) ∼
(d,u), (d,u) ∼ (e, v), then c = d = e, there exist s, i such that s ,→i w, s ,→i u
while for any t not tQc
i
wu, and there exist s′, j such that s′ ,→ j u, s
′ ,→ j v while
for any t not tQc
j
uv. Since every state in W has at most one predecessor, s = s′.
Since there is at most one relation between two different states, i = j. Therefore
s ,→i w, s ,→i v and s ,→i u. Suppose towards contradiction that there exists
o ∈ W such that oQc
i
wv, then o = s. Thus sQc
i
wu or sQc
i
uv by anti-euclidean
property, contradiction. Therefore (c,w) ∼ (e, v).
We still need to verify that this assignment is good, in the sense that: for any
ELKvr formula φ, M ′,w  T (φ) ⇐⇒ M ,w  φ for any w ∈ W . We prove this
by induction on φ and only show the non-trivial case:
If φ = Kvi(ψ, c), then T (φ) =
c
i
¬T (ψ).
⇒: SupposeM ,w 6 Kvi(ψ, c) then there exist t, t
′ such that w ,→i t, w ,→i t,
M , t  ψ, M , t ′  ψ and (c, t) 6∼ (c, t ′). According to the definition of ∼, this
7 Again, take the anti-euclidean property as an example. Suppose uQc
i
vv′, u ,→i t. Suppose u =
〈s′, . . . ,uk〉, v = 〈s
′, . . . , vm〉, v
′ = 〈s′, . . . , v′n〉, w = 〈s
′, . . . ,wl〉. Then ukP
c
i
vmv
′
n and uk →
′
i
wl , which
implies at least one of ukP
c
i
vmwl and ukP
c
i
v′nwl holds. This together with u ,→i v, u ,→i v
′ and u ,→i w
imply either uQc
i
vw or uQc
i
v′w.
9implies ∃u such that uQc
i
t t ′. But we have shown that every state has exactly one
predecessor, so u = w, and wQc
i
t t ′. By induction hypothesis, M ′, t  T (ψ) and
M ′, t ′  T (ψ). Therefore,M ′,w  ◊c
i
T (ψ), i.e.,M ′,w 6 c
i
¬T (ψ).
⇐: Suppose M ′,w 6 c
i
¬T (ψ), i.e. M ′,w  ◊c
i
T (ψ). Then there exist
t, t ′ ∈W such that wQc
i
t t ′,M ′, t  T (ψ) andM ′, t ′  T (ψ). So w ,→i t,w ,→i t
′
but (c, t) 6∼ (c, t ′), i.e. VC(c, t) 6= VC(c, t
′). By induction hypothesis,M , t ψ and
M , t ′ ψ. Therefore,M ,w 6 Kvi(ψ, c).
It follows that for any ELKvr formula φ,
M ′, 〈s′〉  T (φ) ⇐⇒ M , 〈s′〉  φ (3)
With (1), (2) and (3), we can now conclude that for any MLKvr model N , t
there is always an equivalent ELKvr modelM , s and this concludes the proof. 
Remark 2.4 The above lemma implies that for any ELKvr formula φ:
 φ ⇐⇒  T (φ)
which asserts the validities are the same modulo the translation. We need the
stronger version to handle strong completeness later.
3 Completeness of SMLKVr
In this section, we show a direct proof of the strong completeness of SMLKVr
proposed in the previous section. As we will see, this proof is much simpler com-
pared to the original completeness proof of SELKVr in [13] due to the fact that
we do not need to construct a FO canonical Kripke model with value assignments
anymore.
Definition 3.1 The canonical model of SMLKVr is a tuple
M = 〈S, {→i: i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},V 〉
where:
• S is the set of all maximal SMLKVr -consistent sets of MLKvr formulas,
• s→i t ⇐⇒ {φ :iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t,
• sRc
i
tu ⇐⇒ (1){φ :iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t ∩ u and (2){ψ :
c
i
ψ ∈ s} ⊆ t ∪ u,
• V (s) = {p : p ∈ s}.
Note that condition (2) for Rc
i
says that if s can see two i-accessible worlds
which do not agree on c then at least one should satisfy ψ for each Kvi(¬ψ, c) ∈ s.
Proposition 3.2 The canonical modelM is an MLKvr model.
Proof We only need to check the three conditions of Rc
i
.
(i) sRc
i
uv⇒ sRc
i
vu: Obvious.
(ii) sRc
i
uv⇒ s→i u: By condition (1) in the definition of R
c
i
.
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(iii) sRc
i
uv and s →i t ⇒ either sR
c
i
ut or sRc
i
t v: Suppose not. Then according
to the definition of Rc
i
, we have {ψ : c
i
ψ ∈ s} 6⊆ u ∪ t and {ψ : c
i
ψ ∈
s} 6⊆ v ∪ t. So there exist ψ1,ψ2 ∈ {ψ : 
c
i
ψ ∈ s} such that ψ1 6∈ u ∪ t and
ψ2 6∈ v ∪ t. According to the property of maximal consistent sets, this entails
ψ1 ∧ψ2 6∈ u ∪ t and ψ1 ∧ψ2 6∈ v ∪ t. Now, we distinguish two situations:
◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) ∈ s and ◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) 6∈ s, and go on to show that in both
cases we would arrive at contradiction.
Suppose ◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) ∈ s. Note that since ψ1,ψ2 ∈ {ψ : 
c
i
ψ ∈ s},
c
i
ψ1 ∈ s and 
c
i
ψ2 ∈ s. Then according to Kv
r∨, we have c
i
(ψ1 ∧ψ2) ∈ s.
So ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∈ {ψ : 
c
i
ψ ∈ s}. Since {ψ : c
i
ψ ∈ s} ⊆ u∪ v, ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∈ u∪ v.
But this means that ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∈ u∪ t or v ∪ t, contradiction.
Suppose ◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) 6∈ s, then i(ψ1 ∨ ψ2) ∈ s. According to the
definition of Rc
i
, we have ψ1 ∨ψ2 ∈ t. By the property of MCS, at least one
of ψ1 and ψ2 is in t. However, since ψ1 6∈ u ∪ t and ψ2 6∈ v ∪ t, we have
ψ1,ψ2 6∈ t, contradiction.
Therefore, the canonical modelM is indeed an MLKvr model. 
By a Lindenbaum-like argument, every consistent set of MLKvr formulas can
be extended to a maximal consistent set (of MLKvr formulas). In the following
we (as routine) prove the existence lemma for both modalities ◊i and ◊
c
i
in order
to obtain the truth lemma. The proof is the SMLKVr adaption of the proof of
SELKVr in [13].
Given a state s ∈ S such that ◊c
i
φ ∈ s. We let Z = {ψ | iψ ∈ s} ∪ {φ} and
X = {χ |c
i
χ ∈ s}. Since X is countable, we list the elements in X as χi for i ∈ N.
Note that since ⊢ c
i
⊤, ⊤ ∈ X , namely X is non-empty.
Fact 3.3 For any χ ∈ X , {χ} ∪ Z is consistent. Therefore Z and every χ are also
consistent.
Proof Suppose not, then there exists χ ∈ X , ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈ Z such that ⊢ψ1∧ · · · ∧
ψn ∧φ→¬χ . By NECK and DISTK, we have ⊢ i(ψ1∧ · · · ∧ψn)→i(φ→¬χ).
Since iψ1, . . . ,iψn ∈ s, i(φ → ¬χ) ∈ s. Note that Kv
r∨ is equivalent to
i(p→ q)→ (◊
c
i
p→ ◊c
i
q). By SUB, we have ⊢ i(φ→¬χ)∧◊
c
i
φ→ ◊c
i
¬χ . This
together with the fact that i(φ → ¬χ) ∈ s and ◊
c
i
φ ∈ s (assumption), we have
◊c
i
¬χ ∈ s, contradiction. Since ⊤ ∈ X , {⊤}∪ Z is consistent thus Z is consistent.
Let B0 = Z ∪ {χ0}, C0 = Z . We inductively construct Bn and Cn as following:
• If Bn ∪ {χn+1} is consistent, then Bn+1 = Bn ∪ {χn+1}, Cn+1 = Cn.
• Else, Bn+1 = Bn, Cn+1 = Cn ∪ {χn+1}.
• Finally, let B =
⋃
n<ω Bn, C =
⋃
n<ω Cn.
In order to show that B and C are consistent we first show that Bn and Cn are
consistent for each n < ω. Before that we prove a handy proposition which will
be useful soon.
Proposition 3.4 For any finitely many MLKvr formulas ψ1, . . . ,ψn, we have:
⊢ c
i
ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
c
i
ψn ∧◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ψn)→
c
i
(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn)
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Proof From Kvr∨ we have ⊢ c
i
φ ∧ c
i
ψ ∧ ◊i(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) → 
c
i
(φ ∧ ψ). What
we want now is its generalization. By applying Kvr∨, we can have the following
sequence of SMLKVr theorems:
⊢c
i
ψ1 ∧
c
i
ψ2 ∧◊i(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2)→
c
i
(ψ1 ∧ψ2)
⊢c
i
(ψ1 ∧ψ2)∧
c
i
ψ3 ∧◊i(¬(ψ1 ∧ψ2)∧¬ψ3)→ 
c
i
(ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∧ψ3)
· · ·
⊢c
i
(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn−1)∧
c
i
ψn ∧◊i(¬(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn−1)∧¬ψn)→
c
i
(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn)
Note that we have ⊢ ◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ψn)→ ◊i(¬(ψ1 ∧ψk−1)∧¬ψk) in standard
normal modal logic, for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Now by using the above theorems one by
one we can obtain:
⊢ c
i
ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
c
i
ψn ∧◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ψn)→
c
i
(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψn)

Proposition 3.5 For any k ≥ 0, if Bk is consistent and χk+1 is not consistent with
Bk, then χk+1 is consistent with Ck. Therefore Bk and Ck are consistent for k ∈ N.
Proof Suppose not, i.e., χk+1 is not consistent with both Bk and Ck. Let U = Bk\Z ,
V = Ck \ Z , U = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ U}, and V = {¬ψ : ψ ∈ V}. Then there exist
α1, . . . ,αℓ,β1, . . . ,βm,γ1, . . . ,γn ∈ Z such that:
• ⊢ α1 ∧ · · · ∧αℓ ∧
∧
U ∧φ→¬χk+1
• ⊢ β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm ∧
∧
V ∧φ→¬χk+1
• ⊢ γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ∧
∧
U ∧φ→
∧
V
The last one is due to the fact that any formula in Ck \ Z is inconsistent with Bk by
construction. By NECK, DISTK and the definition of Z and X , we have
• i(
∧
U ∧φ→¬χk+1) ∈ s
• i(
∧
V ∧φ→¬χk+1) ∈ s
• i(
∧
U ∧φ→
∧
V ) ∈ s
First, we claim that ◊i(
∧
U ∧ φ) ∈ s. If not, then i¬(
∧
U ∧ φ) ∈ s, which
means that ¬(
∧
U ∧φ) ∈ Z ⊆ Bk. But as U ⊆ Bk, φ ∈ Bk, this implies that Bk is
inconsistent, contradiction.
Then, we claim that ◊i(¬χk+1∧
∧
V ) ∈ s. Since i(
∧
U ∧φ→¬χk+1) ∈ s and
i(
∧
U ∧φ →
∧
V ) ∈ s then i(
∧
U ∧φ → ¬χk+1 ∧
∧
V ), we immediately get
◊i(¬χk+1 ∧
∧
V ) ∈ s due to the fact ◊i(
∧
U ∧φ) ∈ s that we just showed.
Finally, since ◊i(¬χk+1 ∧
∧
V ) ∈ s, c
i
χk+1 ∈ s and 
c
i
ψ ∈ s for all ψ ∈ V , by
Proposition 3.4, we have c
i
(χk+1∧
∧
V ) ∈ s. But since i(
∧
V ∧φ→¬χk+1) ∈ s,
its equivalent i(
∧
V ∧χk+1 →¬φ) is also in s. By DISTKv
r we know ⊢ i(
∧
V ∧
χk+1 → ¬φ)→ 
c
i
(
∧
V ∧ χk+1) → 
c
i
¬φ. Therefore c
i
¬φ ∈ s, contradiction to
◊c
i
φ ∈ s.
Now, we can prove that Bk and Ck are consistent for any k ∈ N. We do induc-
tion on k. For k = 0, then B0 = C0 = Z , whose consistency is shown in Fact 3.3.
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For k = i + 1, consider whether χi+1 is consistent with Bi . If χi+1 is consistent
with Bi , then Bk = Bi ∪χi+1 and Ck = Ci (by induction hypothesis) are consistent.
If χi+1 is inconsistent with Bi , then by induction hypothesis, Bi = Bi+1 and Ci are
consistent. So according to the above conclusion Ci+1 is also consistent. 
Proposition 3.6 B =
⋃
n<ω Bn and C =
⋃
n<ω Cn are both consistent.
Proof Suppose B is not consistent. That is, there exist φ1, . . . ,φn ∈ B such that
⊢ φ1∧· · ·∧φn →⊥. Therefore, there must be a finite m such that φ1, . . . ,φn ∈ Bm.
But this means that Bm is already inconsistent, contradictory to the construction
of Bk. The case for C is similar. 
It is routine to prove the following:
Lemma 3.7 (Existence Lemma for ◊i) Given a state s ∈ S. If ◊iφ ∈ s, then there
exists t ∈ S such that s→i t and φ ∈ t;
Also we have the existence lemma for ◊c
i
:
Lemma 3.8 (Existence Lemma for ◊c
i
) Given a state s ∈ S. If ◊c
i
ψ ∈ s, then there
exist t,u ∈ S such that sRc
i
tu and ψ ∈ t ∩ u.
Proof Let Z , B and C be defined as above. Due to Proposition 3.6 B and C are
both consistent. Therefore, both can be extended into maximal consistent sets,
say t and u. Now, the construction of B and C itself guarantee that sRc
i
tu and
φ ∈ t,u. 
Lemma 3.9 (Truth Lemma) For any state s ∈M and φ,M , s  φ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ s.
Proof Prove by induction. We only give the ◊c
i
ψ case; the others are routine.
⇒: SupposeM , s  ◊c
i
ψ. Then there exist t,u such that sRc
i
tu,M , t ψ and
M ,u  ψ. By induction hypothesis, ψ ∈ t ∩ u. If ◊c
i
ψ 6∈ s, then c
i
¬ψ ∈ s, which
implies ¬ψ ∈ t ∪ u by the construction of Rc
i
, contradiction. Therefore, ◊c
i
ψ ∈ s.
⇐:Suppose ◊c
i
ψ ∈ s. Then according to the existence lemma for ◊c
i
, there exist
t,u such that sRc
i
tu and ψ ∈ t ∩ u. By induction hypothesis,M , t ψ,M ,u ψ.
ThereforeM , s  ◊c
i
ψ. 
The completeness result then follows immediately:
Theorem 3.10 (Completeness) SMLKVr is strongly complete over arbitrary mod-
els.
Remark 3.11 At this point, it is interesting to compare our canonical model with
the canonical model used in [13]. A complication in [13] is that merely max-
imal consistent sets are not enough to build a FO canonical Kripke model. How-
ever, as we have seen, we only use the maximal consistent sets in our canonical
MLKvrmodel: it does not involve value assignments. Thus we have restored the
symmetry between the logical language and the model to some extent: there is no
longer too much information in the model, which cannot be talked about by the
language. Note that we allow sRi t t, which also helps to have compact models.
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4 Extended language with binary modalities
In the previous sections, we treat ◊c
i
as a unary modality interpreted by a tern-
ary relation. Essentially, ◊c
i
can be viewed as a binary modality where the two
arguments are the same. In this section, we restore the symmetry between the
semantics and the syntax one step further by having the binary ◊c
i
(·, ·) in the
language. Surprisingly, this extension does not increase the expressive power of
MLKvr . What is more, the new logic is normal. Consequently, the extension will
help us to understand MLKvr more deeply from a normal modal logic point of
view.
The extended language MLKvb is given by the following BNF (b for binary):
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) |iφ |
c
i
(φ,φ)
We define ◊c
i
(ψ,φ) as ¬c
i
(¬ψ,¬φ). And ◊c
i
φ is now equivalent to the MLKvb
formula ◊c
i
(φ,φ). To see the intuition, for example, ◊c
i
(p,¬p) says that i can see
a p world and a ¬p world which do not agree on the value of c. Formally, the
semantics is defined on the same MLKvr models M = 〈S, {→i: i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈
I, c ∈ C},V,VC〉:
M , s  ◊c
i
(φ,ψ) ⇔ there exist t ,u ∈ S such that sRc
i
tu,M , t  φ andM ,u ψ.
The above semantics coincides with the standard semantics for binary diamond
modalities [1]. 8 Note that ◊c
i
(φ,ψ) is essentially different from ◊c
i
(φ ∨ψ): the
latter only says that there are two φ∨ψ-successors that have different values of c,
but not necessarily one φ world and one ψ world. So, on first sight, MLKvrseems
to be weaker than MLKvb.
However, we will show by the following lemma that MLKvr and MLKvb are
equally expressive, by reducing the binary ◊c
i
to the unary ◊c
i
in presence of the
diamond ◊i .
Lemma 4.1 ◊c
i
(φ,ψ) is equivalent to the disjunction of the following three formu-
las:
(i) ◊c
i
φ ∧◊iψ
(ii) ◊c
i
ψ∧◊iφ
(iii) ◊iφ ∧◊iψ∧¬◊
c
i
φ ∧¬◊c
i
ψ∧◊c
i
(φ ∨ψ)
Proof The proof consists of two directions.
First, we show that each of the three disjuncts entails ◊c
i
(φ,ψ).
(i) For any model M , s that satisfies ◊c
i
φ ∧ ◊iψ, there exists t,u ∈ S such that
sRc
i
tu, t  φ and u  φ, and exists v such that s→i v and v  ψ. According
to the property of Rc
i
, at least one of sRc
i
t v and sRc
i
uv holds. W.l.o.g. suppose
sRc
i
t v. Then according to the semantics of ◊c
i
, we have s  ◊c
i
(φ,ψ).
8 Binary modalities appear in many modal logics, such as the until operator in temporal logic, and the
relevant implication in relevance logic interpreted on Kripke models with a ternary relation.
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(ii) For ◊c
i
ψ∧◊iφ, the proof is similar to (i).
(iii) IfM , s  ◊iφ∧◊iψ∧¬◊
c
i
φ∧¬◊c
i
ψ∧◊c
i
(φ∨ψ), then: s has φ-successors and
ψ-successors; all φ-successors have the same value of c, all φ-successors have
the same value of c, but the two values are different due toM , s  ◊c
i
(φ∨ψ).
So we can easily guarantee that there are two states, one φ-successor and one
ψ-successor of s such that they have different values with regard to c. This
meansM , s  ◊c
i
(φ,ψ).
Second, we prove that ifM , s  ◊c
i
(φ,ψ), then at least one of (i), (ii) and (iii)
holds.
SupposeM , s  ◊c
i
(φ,ψ), namely there exist t,u ∈M such that sRc
i
tu,M , t 
φ andM ,u ψ. We immediately haveM , s  ◊iφ ∧◊iψ∧◊
c
i
(φ ∨ψ). If neither
◊c
i
φ nor ◊c
i
ψ holds on s, then M , s  ◊iφ ∧ ◊iψ ∧ ¬◊
c
i
φ ∧ ¬◊c
i
ψ ∧ ◊c
i
(φ ∨ψ).
Therefore, M , s  (◊c
i
φ ∧ ◊iψ) ∨ (◊
c
i
ψ ∧ ◊iφ) ∨ (◊iφ ∧ ◊iψ ∧ ¬◊
c
i
φ ∧ ¬◊c
i
ψ ∧
◊c
i
(φ ∨ψ))
In sum, we can now conclude the equivalence. 
With this lemma in hand, the reduction theorem is straightforward:
Theorem 4.2 (Reduction) For any MLKvb formula φ, there exists an MLKvr for-
mula ψ such that for any pointed modelM , s: M , s  φ ⇐⇒ M , s ψ.
Proof We define a reduction function r inductively:
• r(p) = p; r(¬φ) = ¬r(φ); r(φ ∧ψ) = r(φ)∧ r(ψ); r(◊iφ) = ◊i r(φ);
• r(◊c
i
(φ,ψ)) = (◊c
i
r(φ) ∧ ◊i r(ψ)) ∨ (◊
c
i
r(ψ) ∧ ◊i r(φ)) ∨ (◊i r(φ) ∧ ◊i r(ψ) ∧
¬◊c
i
r(φ)∧¬◊c
i
r(ψ)∧◊c
i
(r(φ)∨ r(ψ))).
The correctness of the reduction is guaranteed based on Lemma 4.1. It is not
hard (but important) to see that the rewriting always terminates. 
Remark 4.3 Although MLKvr is equally expressive as MLKvb in presence of ◊i ,
it is not the case if ◊i is absent. To see this, consider the following two pointed
models M , s and N , x where sRc
i
tu, sRc
i
uv in the left model, and xRc
i
yz in the
other model:
t : p
c
y : p
cs
issss
99ss
i //
i
▲▲
▲▲
%%▲
▲▲
u : p x
irrrr
88rr
i
▲▲
▲▲
&&▲
▲▲
v : q
c
z : p
We can use ◊c
i
(p,q) to distinguish the two pointed models; however, they are
indistinguishable by using any formula with the unary ◊c
i
but no ◊i , which can be
proved by a simple induction.
Now observe that MLKvb is a standard modal language defined on standard
Kripke models with standard semantics. It is a relatively routine exercise to
propose a normal modal logic system with the following axioms SYM, INCL and
ATEUC to capture the corresponding special properties of the models:
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System SMLKVb
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK i(p→ q)→ (ip→iq)
DISTKv
b c
i
(p→ q, r)→ (c
i
(p, r)→c
i
(q, r))
SYM c
i
(p,q)→c
i
(q, p)
INCL ◊c
i
(p,q)→ ◊ip
ATEUC ◊c
i
(p,q)∧◊i r → ◊
c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(q, r)
Rules
MP
φ,φ→ψ
ψ
NECK
φ
iφ
NECKv
b
φ
c
i
(φ,ψ)
SUB
φ
φ[p/ψ]
RE
ψ↔ χ
φ↔ φ[ψ/χ]
Note that due to SYM, we do not need to include the variations of DISTKvb
and NECKvb w.r.t. the second argument in the binary c
i
(cf. [1] for the standard
proof systems of polyadic normal modal logics.)
In this system SMLKVb we can derive all the axioms in SMLKVr . Before
proving it, we first show the following handy propositions.
Proposition 4.4 ⊢SMLKVb ◊
c
i
(p ∨ q, r)→ ◊c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(q, r).
Proof This proposition captures the interaction between boolean operator ∨ and
◊c
i
9 . So we can only start from the axiom DISTKvb. Note that RE is used fre-
quently.
(1) c
i
(p→ q, r)→ (c
i
(p, r)→c
i
(q, r)) (DISTKvb)
(2) ¬(c
i
(p, r)→c
i
(q, r))→¬c
i
(p→ q, r)
(3) c
i
(p, r)∧◊c
i
(¬q,¬r)→ ◊c
i
(p ∧¬q,¬r)
(4) ◊c
i
(¬q,¬r)→ (¬c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(p ∧¬q,¬r))
(5) ◊c
i
(¬q,¬r)→ (◊c
i
(¬p,¬r)∨◊c
i
(p∧¬q,¬r))
(6) ◊c
i
(p∨ q, r)→ (◊c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(¬p ∧ (p ∨ q), r)) ((5) & SUB)
(7) ◊c
i
(p∨ q, r)→ (◊c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(q, r)) 
Proposition 4.5 ⊢SMLKVb ◊
c
i
(p ∧ q, r)→ ◊c
i
(p, r)∧◊c
i
(q, r).
Proof This is similar to the above proof. 
Proposition 4.6 ⊢SMLKVb 
c
i
(p, r)∧c
i
(q, r)∧◊i¬r →
c
i
(p,q).
Proof Easily derived from ATEUC: ◊c
i
(p,q)∧◊i r → ◊
c
i
(p, r)∨◊c
i
(q, r). 
Proposition 4.7 All the SMLKVr axioms are provable in SMLKVb and the rules
of SMLKVr are admissible in SMLKVb (viewing ◊c
i
φ as ◊c
i
(φ,φ)).
Proof We need to check DISTKvr , Kvr∨ and NECKvr in SMLKVr .
(i) DISTKvr :
(1) ◊c
i
(p,q)→ ◊ip (INCL)
(2) i¬p→ 
c
i
(¬p,¬q)
(3) i(p→ q)→
c
i
(p→ q, p) ((2) SUB)
9 Actually this is a standard axiom for normal modal logic. In case the binary case might not be that
familiar, we give the proof here.
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(4) i(p→ q)→
c
i
(p→ q,q) ((2) SUB)
(5) i(p→ q)→ (
c
i
(p→ q, p)∧c
i
(p→ q,q)) ((3) (4))
(6) i(p→ q)→ (
c
i
(p, p)→c
i
(q, p))∧ (c
i
(p,q)→c
i
(q,q)) (DISTKvb)
(7) i(p→ q)→ (
c
i
p→c
i
q) ((6) SYM)
(ii) Kvr∨:
(1) ◊c
i
(p,q)∧◊i r → ◊
c
i
(q, r)∨◊c
i
(p, r) (ATEUC)
(2) ◊c
i
(p ∨ q, p ∨ q)∧◊i(p ∧ q)→ ◊
c
i
(p∨ q, p ∧ q) (SUB)
(3) ◊c
i
(p ∨ q)∧◊i(p ∧ q)→ (◊
c
i
(p, p ∧ q)∨◊c
i
(q, p∧ q)) (Prop. 4.4)
(4) ◊c
i
(p ∨ q)∧◊i(p ∧ q)→ (◊
c
i
(p, p)∨◊c
i
(q,q)) (Prop. 4.5)
(5) ◊c
i
(p ∨ q)∧◊i(p ∧ q)→ (◊
c
i
p ∨◊c
i
q)
(iii) NECKvr : It is a special case of NECKvb in SMLKVb where the two arguments
are the same.
Other axioms and rules in SMLKVr are exactly the same as in SMLKVb. 
Now as we can see below, the standard technique suffices to prove the com-
pleteness of SMLKVb. The only tricky point is the ternary canonical relation.
Theorem 4.8 SMLKVb is sound and strongly complete w.r.t. MLKvr models.
Proof The soundness is straightforward to check. For the completeness we build
a canonical model:
M = 〈S, {→i: i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈ C},VC〉
• S is the set of all maximal SMLKVb-consistent sets of MLKvb formulas,
• s→i t ⇐⇒ {φ :iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t,
• sRc
i
tu ⇐⇒ (1) {φ : iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t ∩ u and (2) for any 
c
i
(φ,ψ) ∈ s, φ ∈ t or
ψ ∈ u.
• VC(s) = {p : p ∈ s}.
Note that the existence lemma for ◊c
i
is quite routine for normal polyadic
modal logic, cf. [1]. The idea is to build two i-successors t,u of s if ◊c
i
(φ,ψ) ∈ s,
such that φ ∈ t, ψ ∈ u and sRc
i
tu. According to the method in [1, pp. 200], we
can build two maximal consistent sets t,u such that φ ∈ t and ψ ∈ u, and for all
c
i
(χ1,χ2) ∈ s we have χ1 ∈ t or χ2 ∈ u. To make sure sR
c
i
tu we just need to
check condition (1). To see this, note that by INCL we have iχ → 
c
i
(χ ,θ) ∈ s
and by SYM we have iχ → 
c
i
(θ ,χ) ∈ s. Therefore for each iχ ∈ s we have
c
i
(χ ,⊥) ∈ s and c
i
(⊥,χ) ∈ s. Due to the construction of maximal consistent sets
t,u, we have χ ∈ t or ⊥ ∈ u, and ⊥ ∈ t or χ ∈ u, which implies χ ∈ t ∩ u. Thus
{χ :iχ ∈ s} ⊆ t ∩ u. This concludes the proof that sR
c
i
tu. Based on the existence
lemmas for both ◊i and ◊
c
i
we can prove the truth lemma φ ∈ s ⇐⇒ s  φ using
standard techniques.
In the rest of this proof we verify that the canonical model satisfies the three
properties of MLKvr models. Note that condition (1) in the definition of Rc
i
is
symmetric, and condition (2) is also implicitly symmetric due to axiom SYM. It is
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also obvious that sRc
i
tu implies sRi t and sRiu by definition. We only need to verify
the anti-euclidean property.
Towards contradiction suppose sRc
i
tu, s →i v but neither sR
c
i
t v nor sRc
i
uv.
Then according to the definition of Rc
i
, there exist c
i
(φ1,ψ1),
c
i
(φ2,ψ2) ∈ s such
that ¬φ1 ∈ t,¬ψ1 ∈ v, ¬φ2 ∈ u and ¬ψ2 ∈ v. Therefore ¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2 ∈ v.
Since s →i v, ◊i(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) ∈ s. By DISTKv
b, SYM, and NECKvb, it is not
hard to show ⊢SMLKVb 
c
i
(φ1,ψ1)→
c
i
(φ1,ψ1 ∨ψ2) and ⊢SMLKVb 
c
i
(φ2,ψ2)→
c
i
(φ2,ψ1∨ψ2). So 
c
i
(φ1,ψ1∨ψ2),
c
i
(φ2,ψ1∨ψ2) ∈ s. By Proposition 4.6 and
SUB, ⊢SMLKVb 
c
i
(φ1,ψ1∨ψ2)∧
c
i
(φ2,ψ1∨ψ2)∧◊i(ψ1∨ψ2)→
c
i
(φ1,φ2). Since
c
i
(φ1,ψ1∨ψ2), 
c
i
(φ2,ψ1∨ψ2) and ◊i(ψ1∨ψ2) are all in s, 
c
i
(φ1,φ2) ∈ s. This
together with sRc
i
tu imply that φ1 ∈ t or φ2 ∈ u, contradictory to the assumption
that ¬φ1 ∈ t and ¬φ2 ∈ u. 
5 Applications
5.1 Bisimulation
In the field of modal logic, various bisimulation notions help to characterize the
expressive power of the new semantics-driven logics. As a normal modal logic,
MLKvb has a natural notion of bisimulation (cf. [1]), and it will in turn help us to
find a notion of bisimulation over FO Kripke models for the original ELKvr .
Definition 5.1 (C-Bisimulation) Let M1 = 〈S1, {→
1
i
: i ∈ I}, {Rc
i
: i ∈ I , c ∈
C},V1〉, M2 = 〈S2, {→
2
i
: i ∈ I , c ∈ C}, {Qc
i
: i ∈ I},V2〉 be two models for MLKv
b
(also for MLKvr). A C-bisimulation between M1 and M2 is a non-empty binary
relation Z ⊆ S1 × S2 such that for all s1Zs2, the following conditions are satisfied:
Inv : V1(s1) = V2(s2);
Zig : s1 →
1
i
t1 ⇒ ∃t2 such that s2 →
2
i
t2 and t1Zt2;
Zag : s2 →
2
i
t2 ⇒ ∃t1 such that s1 →
1
i
t1 and t1Zt2;
Kvb-Zig : s1R
c
i
t1u1 ⇒ ∃t2,u2 ∈ S2 such that t1Zt2, u1Zu2 and s2Q
c
i
t2u2;
Kvb-Zag : s2Q
c
i
t2u2 ⇒ ∃t1,u1 ∈ S1 such that t1Zt2, u1Zu2 and s1R
c
i
t1u1.
We sayM , s and N , t are C-bisimilar (M , s↔C N , t) if there is a C-bisimulation Z
betweenM and N and (s, t) ∈ Z.
Theorem 5.2 IfM1, s1↔C M2, s2, thenM1, s1 ≡MLKvb M2, s2.
Proof Suppose M1, s1 ↔C M2, s2. We prove by induction on the structure of
MLKvb formulas, and the only non-trivial case is when φ = ◊c
i
(ψ,χ).
SupposeM1, s1  ◊
c
i
(ψ,χ), then ∃t1,u1 ∈ S1 such that s1R
c
i
t1u1 withM1, t1 
ψ and M1,u1  χ . By Kvb-Zig, there exist t2,u2 ∈ S2 such that t1Zt2, u1Zu2
and s2Q
c
i
t2u2. By induction hypothesis, M2, t2  ψ and M2,u2  χ . Therefore,
M2, s2  ◊
c
i
(ψ,χ). The other side is similar by Kvb-Zag. 
As in normal modal logic, we have the following theorem forMLKvb (we omit
the rather standard proof, but one can try to see how the binary modality ◊c
i
facilitates the proof):
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Theorem 5.3 Suppose M , N are finite models. Then M , s ↔C N , t ⇐⇒
M , s ≡MLKvb N , t.
Since MLKvr and MLKvb have the same expressive power we immediately
have:
Corollary 5.4 Suppose M and N are finite models. Then M , s↔C N , t ⇐⇒
M , s ≡MLKvr N , t.
In [12], a notion of bisimulation has been offered for ELKv, the epistemic logic
with unconditional Kvi operators. However, for ELKv
r it was not that clear about
the suitable bisimulation notion. Now we can recast C-bisimulation back to the
setting of ELKvr over FO Kripke models since ELKvr and MLKvr are essentially
the same language.
Definition 5.5 (C-bisimulation over FO Kripke models) Given two pointed FO
Kripke models M = 〈S1,D1, {→
1
i
: i ∈ I},V1,V
1
C
〉, and N = 〈S2,D2, {→
2
i
: i ∈
I},V2,V
2
C
〉, a relation Z⊆ S1×S2 is a C-bisimulation between the two modelsM ,N
if whenever s1Zs2 we have:
Inv V1(s1) = V2(s2);
Zig : s1 →
1
i
t1 ⇒ ∃t2 such that s2 →
2
i
t2 and t1Zt2;
Zag : s2 →
2
i
t2 ⇒ ∃t1 such that s1 →
1
i
t1 and t1Zt2;
Kvr-Zig If s1 →
1
i
t1 and s1 →
1
i
u1 and V
1
C
(c, t1) 6= V
1
C
(c,u1) then there are t2 and
u2 in N such that s2 →
2
i
t2, s2 →
2
i
u2, t1Z t2, u1Zu2, and V
2
C
(c, t2) 6= V
2
C
(c,u2) in
N .
Kvr-Zag If s2 →
2
i
t2 and s→
2
i
u2 and V
2
C
(c, t2) 6= V
2
C
(c,u2) then there are t1 and u1
inM such that s1 →
1
i
t1, s→
1
i
u1, t1Z t2, u1Zu2 and V
1
C
(c, t1) 6= V
1
C
(c,u1) inM .
Abusing the notation, FO Kripke models M , s and N , t are C-bisimilar (M , s↔C
N , t) iff there exists a C-bisimulation Z betweenM and N such that s, t ∈ Z.
Now since MLKvb and MLKvr have exactly the same expressive power, and
MLKvr is equivalent to ELKvr modulo translation. The above C-bisimilation works
for ELKvr , as proved in detailed in [6]:
Theorem 5.6 For finite FO Kripke models M1,M2: M1, s1 ↔C M2, s2 iff
M1, s1 ≡ELKvr M2, s2.
5.2 Completeness of SMLKV
The unconditional Kv operator was introduced in [7] in the context of epistemic
logic (call the language ELKv):
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | Kiφ | Kvi c
Essentially, Kvic is Kvi(⊤, c) in ELKv
r . The semantics is as in the case of ELKvr ,
which is based on FO Kripke models. Plaza gave two axioms on top of S5 which
are the counterparts of the introspection axioms in standard epistemic logic (over
FO epistemic models):
Kvic→ KiKvi c ¬Kvic→ Ki¬Kvic
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However, neither [7] nor [12,13] gave a complete proof of this simple logic. Here
we look at this language from our ◊c
i
perspective, and consider the corresponding
simple language (MLKv) over the class of all the models:
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) |iφ |
c
i
⊥
Note that ¬Kvi c can be viewed as ◊
c
i
⊤. Thus Kvic is indeed 
c
i
⊥.
The semantics is just as in MLKvr but we only allow ⊤ as the argument for ◊c
i
.
As in the case of ELKvr and MLKvr we can simply show that:
Proposition 5.7 For any set of ELKv formula Σ∪ {φ}, Σ  φ iff T (Σ)  T (φ).
Now based on this view, a natural system SMLKV is obtained by simplifying
the system SMLKVr :
System SMLKV
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
DISTK i(p→ q)→ (ip→iq)
INCLT ◊c
i
⊤→ ◊i⊤
Rules
MP
φ,φ→ψ
ψ
NECK
φ
iφ
SUB
φ
φ[p/ψ]
RE
ψ↔ χ
φ↔ φ[ψ/χ]
Note that due to the fact that the only ◊c
i
formula is ◊c
i
⊤ (and c
i
⊥), most of the
previous axioms and rules do not apply. We only need to add one axiom INCLT
on top of the usual normal modal logic, inspired by the INCL axioms of SMLKVb.
We go on to prove the completeness of SMLKV.
Definition 5.8 The canonical model M is a tuple 〈S, {→i : i ∈ I}, {R
c
i
: i ∈ I, c ∈
C},V 〉 where:
• S is the set of maximal SMLKV-consistent sets,
• s→i t ⇐⇒ {φ :iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t,
• sRc
i
t t ′ ⇐⇒ s→i t, s→i t
′ and ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s,
• V (s) = {p : p ∈ s}
The only tricky point is the definition of canonical relations Rc
i
. The intuition
is that as long as a state can see two states having different values, then we can
safely assume all the states that it can see have different values. Note that in
MLKvr models we also allow sRc
i
t t. We first need to verify that M is an MLKvr
model:
Proposition 5.9 The canonical modelM is an MLKvr model.
Proof We only need to verify the three conditions. The first two are again obvious
by definition, so we only prove the anti-euclidean property. Suppose sRc
i
t t ′ and
s →i u. Then s →i t, s →i t
′ and ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s. So both sRc
i
tu and sRc
i
t ′u by the
definition of Rc
i
. 
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The existence lemma for ◊i is routine. As for the case of ◊
c
i
:
Lemma 5.10 (Existence Lemma for ◊c
i
) If ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s, then there exist t,u such that
sRc
i
tu.
Proof Suppose ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s then due to INCLT ◊i⊤ ∈ s. By the existence lemma for
◊i , it follows that there exists t such that s→i t. Therefore by definition sR
c
i
t t. 
Lemma 5.11 For any s inM and MLKv formula φ,M , s  φ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ s.
Proof The only interesting case is when φ = ◊c
i
⊤.
⇒: Suppose M , s  ◊c
i
⊤. Then there exist t, t ′ such that sRc
i
t t ′. By the
definition of Rc
i
, ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s.
⇐: Suppose ◊c
i
⊤ ∈ s. By the existence lemma for ◊c
i
, there exist t, t ′ such that
sRc
i
t t ′. ThereforeM , s  ◊c
i
⊤. 
Theorem 5.12 SMLKV is strongly complete w.r.t. MLKv models.
A corollary follows immediately based on Proposition 5.7:
Corollary 5.13 SMLKV (viewing INCLT as ¬Kvi⊤ → Kˆi⊤) is strongly complete
w.r.t. ELKvr models.
6 Discussion and future work
In this paper, we introduce a ternary relation based simple semantics to the “know-
ing value” logic without explicit value assignments. Under this semantics, the logic
can be viewed as a disguised normal modal logic with both standard unary and
binary modalities. The use of this perspective is demonstrated by various applica-
tions.
Another intuitive way to simplify the original FO-Kripke semantics is to in-
troduce a binary relation ≍c for each c representing the inequality of the value
of c. Correspondingly, in the language, besides ◊iφ we may introduce ◊cφ for-
mulas saying that there is a different world where φ holds but c has a different
value compared to the current world. However, it is not straightforward to express
¬Kv(ψ, c) in this language. The closest counterpart ◊i(ψ ∧ ◊cψ) will not do the
job alone. We probably need to add a further condition: ◊i◊cp→ ◊ip which says
the ≍c successors of an i-reachable world are again i-reachable. Actually it means
that we should combine →i and ≍c which is almost our ternary R
c
i
. Moreover,
to axiomatize this ≍c we need the axioms of anti-equivalence (irreflexivity, sym-
metry, and anti-euclidean property 10 ). However, irreflexivity and anti-euclidean
property for the binary ≍c are not definable in modal logic. We probably need to
do the same as in the ◊c
i
case: use Kv∨ to capture the i-accessible anti-euclidean
property to some extent. Having said the above, it is clear that our approach in
this paper is more intuitive and technically natural.
To close, we list a few directions which we leave for future occasions:
10Here anti-euclidean property means if x ≍c y and there is another world z then x ≍c z or y ≍c z.
A simple disjoint union argument can show it is not modally definable. Thanks to Zhiguang Zhao for
pointing it out.
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• The corresponding results in the setting of epistemic (S5) models.
• Characterization theorem of ELKvr (MLKvr) within first-order modal logic via
C-bisimulation.
• A decision procedure for ELKvr (MLKvr) based on the simplified models.
• In similar ways, we can try to simplify the semantics for other “knowing-X”
logics, such as knowing whether, knowing how, and so on.
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